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ROUND TABLE

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A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

M-DAY AND AMERICA

LEO M. CHERNE · QUINCY HOWE · HERBERT HEATON

334th BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY • 122

JULY 14, 1940

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ROUND TABLE

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No. 122

NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

M-DAY AND AMERICA

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

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QUINCY HOWE, Author and Editor

LEO M. CHERNE, Executive Secretary, Research Institute of America

HERBERT HEATON, Professor of History, University of Minnesota

* A radio discussion broadcast from New York City over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, July 14, 1940, at 2:30 P.M., Eastern Daylight Saving Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

M-DAY AND AMERICA

MR. HEATON: I wish you'd tell me what "M-Day" is. Out in the Middle West it would be Minnesota Day, or Michigan Day, or Montana Day. But I assume that it is none of those.

MR. HOWE: No, M-Day is an abbreviation of Mobilization Day. Mobilization Day is the day that the United States goes to war, and on that day the War Department has certain plans to mobilize the man power and industry of the country.

MR. HEATON: I understand you have been studying this mobilization question, Cherne. What are we to understand by the term "mobilization"?

MR. CHERNE: Mobilization takes different forms in different environment. For example, when a sizeable Italian army of self-proclaimed educators and civilizers marched into Ethiopia, the inevitable native mobilization order read as follows:

> Everyone will now be mobilized and all boys old enough to carry a spear will be sent to Addis Ababa. Married men will take their wives to carry food and cook. Those without wives will take any women without husbands. Women with small babies need not go. The blind, those who cannot walk or for any reason cannot carry a spear, are exempt. Anyone found at home after receipt of this order will be hanged.[1]

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[1] *During the last war a special board was set up by the Secretary of War to enquire into the cases of conscientious objectors to war. Of 1,697 cases examined, 1,461 were found to be sincere and given agricultural work in lieu of military service. From September, 1917, to November, 1918, 371 professed objectors within the army were tried by courts mar-*

That was complete mobilization in a country where even a shillalah would have been an improvement in armament.

MR. HEATON: Yet it isn't quite the mobilization that we expect in the United States when M-Day dawns, I suppose.

MR. HOWE: It sounds, Heaton, as though M-Day were already here. Are we at war now? I understood that we are still at peace, technically at least, and, although we are talking "M-Day" and "if and when we go to war," our Gallup Polls show that over ninety per cent of the people right along have wanted the United States to keep out of war.[2]

MR. CHERNE: Well, let's recognize, in all frankness, that right now we are no longer in a completely peaceful society. We are halfway between the individual motivations of peacetime and the community victory drive of a war-bent nation.

MR. HEATON: Are we, then, in a prebelligerent or nonbelligerent, stage of unneutral neutrality?

MR. CHERNE: In international law, the terms "belligerency" and "nonbelligerency," as you know, have become confused.[3]

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tial and sentenced to terms ranging from three months to fifty years. Religious objectors (as distinguished from those who objected to war on grounds of conscience, not of religion) claiming exemption from combat duty numbered 55,368. At the present time the proposed draft act recognizes exemptions for members of any "well-recognized religious sect," but provides that such persons are not exempt from noncombatant duty.

[2] *The latest figures of the Gallup Poll show that sixteen per cent of Americans would have voted for war on June 2 (after the Flanders fighting but before the Battle of France), nineteen per cent on June 14 (during the Battle of France and after the entry of Italy into the war), and fourteen per cent on July 7 (after the collapse of the French resistance).*

[3] *For a discussion of international law and its relation to the present conflict, see the* ROUND TABLE *broadcast of October 15, 1939—"International Law—What Is It?"*

MR. HOWE: But aren't we morally and economically at war now?

MR. HEATON: That is a dangerous question, according to the Gallup Polls and all the rest. What does concern me is not answering an impossible question—with all due respect to you, Howe—but what kind of a plan has been prepared for the time when the President, or Congress, officially declares that the country is at war?

MR. CHERNE: The plan that has been prepared is really three separate plans. There is the M-Day plan, prepared by the War Department for military strategy and tactics. That is the plan to be used for the purpose of military warfare. Those plans are secret.

MR. HEATON: That is the fighting plan?

MR. CHERNE: That's right!

MR. HOWE: And that would mean that we don't know—can't know—ahead of time what we are going to fight for and where we are going to fight. This mobilization plan you are speaking of can be used for any and all circumstances. The actual circumstances under which it will be used are a secret of the War Department, naturally, and cannot be publicly discussed because perhaps even the War Department does not yet know just where this plan is to be put into effect.

MR. CHERNE: For the purpose of planning, it is important that we know what we are going to fight for or who we are going to fight.

MR. HOWE: Or where!

MR. CHERNE: The War Department's plans are based upon every conceivable type of warfare.

MR. HEATON: And when the time comes you pull the appropriate one out of a particular pigeonhole and apply the mobilization plan to that particular case?

MR. CHERNE: That is correct!

CORPORATION INCOME AND TAXES 1913-22

(IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)



*Income, war, and excess profits tax (1917–22).

MR. HEATON: I assume that the plan we are concerned with is the double plan of looking after the supply of fighting men and the task of seeing that they are fed with a constant supply of the necessary materials.

MR. CHERNE: Now you are talking about industrial mobilization; industrial planning. They call it the I.M.P. That plan is one which will enable the entire economic life, the civilian life of the nation, to be geared to the military machine so that every man, every phase of material and munitions production required for victory—for quick victory—will be utilized.[4]

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[4] *The full text of the 1939 revision of the Industrial Mobilization Plan may be found as an appendix to the Bidwell and Tobin volume referred to in the list of suggested readings on page 23.*

MR. HOWE: As I understand it, that would probably be the most important part of the whole thing. From reading the proofs of your book, *M-Day and What It Means to You*, I gather we are probably pretty well set as far as man power goes, but that what we need is the industrial preparation, especially in the light of events in Europe. During the last war the British and French supplied us with a good deal of equipment for fighting. This time we would have to be on our own.

MR. HEATON: Tell us something about the history of this plan. Is it a legacy of the last war, or was it hatched to gather in the experience of the war?

MR. CHERNE: It is the result but not a legacy of the war. The planning was begun in 1921. The office of Assistant Secretary of War was created in 1921 for the specific purpose of planning for industrial mobilization in the event of a future war. Since 1921 the plan has been conceived by the officers in the War and Navy Departments, has been examined and contributed to by leading executives, industrial leaders, civilian leaders, economists; has been examined critically by Congress on several occasions, and has, as a matter of fact, been studied by three separate Congressional investigations.[5]

MR. HOWE: I think that everyone would like to know whether this plan is going to be administered and run by army people or by civilians.

MR. HEATON: Apparently it was devised by a combination of military and naval experts, of economists, of businessmen, and of Congressmen. That sounds like a rather far-reaching attempt to produce a democratic, or at any rate not at all a "brass hat," plan.

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[5] *Most recently by the so-called Nye Committee from 1934 to 1936. Criticisms of the plan by the Nye Committee centered around war profits, inequality of burdens on capital and labor, the safeguarding of civil liberties. Many of the proposals of the Committee were included in the 1936 revision of the plan.*

MR. CHERNE: I think both of you are hitting at one phase of the problem that should be openly discussed. All of these plans result in an end—temporary or permanent—to our democratic form of government. Naturally, the plan has been so devised as to retain as much as possible of our normal peacetime civilian life without sacrifice to the war effort. That is accomplished first of all by placing these plans in the hands of civilian administrators in wartime.

MR. HEATON: You said it had been revised frequently. Has it been revised, say, quite recently?

MR. CHERNE: It was revised last year before the war.

MR. HEATON: So it needs another revision now?

MR. CHERNE: You may be sure that it is being thoroughly studied.

MR. HOWE: You spoke of democratic aims. I think we are getting into the question of ends and means. We have to resort to pretty rigid means in order to defend ourselves, perhaps, but as we adopt those means we want to remember the ends toward which we are working and not let the means become too violent and cause us to set up here the kind of government, the kind of system, that we are opposed to and don't want to have intrude on our lives in this country.

MR. HEATON: I have rather gathered from what Cherne said that he had very few fears in that respect; that, apparently, far more than in any other country—assuming that any other country has had such a plan—the American plan has been far-reaching in its attempt to weave together all the aspects of American thought into a plan which would represent the very best of American brains and the very best of American standards.

MR. CHERNE: Not only is that true, but the assurance (any assurance possible) of the continuance of our normal civilian civil liberties rests most securely wherever any plan does exist, and I am almost prepared to say *any* plan. You are unquestionably in the

position to comment quite thoroughly on the English experience in the first eight months of their war, Heaton.

MR. HEATON: I don't know that I am. I know only what I read in the newspapers, but I gathered that there was little plan in France, there was little plan in England; that the British and the French were painfully slow in trying to improvise a plan; and that, apparently, the only country that, so far as we know, had a plan of this kind seems to have been Germany.

MR. CHERNE: It is interesting to go back to the German plan. In 1934 the military attaché of the German government was privileged to study our industrial mobilization plan. Let me emphasize this was not "fifth column" nor surreptitious work. Anyone can study the plans; they are not confidential.

MR. HEATON: They are public property.

MR. CHERNE: It is interesting to notice that within six months after the study of the plan by the military attaché the national defense act was adopted by Germany as the framework for their present warfare and is patterned after the American industrial mobilization plan.

MR. HOWE: I would like to make this observation in connection with it: It seems that the Germans knew how to plan, and what they were planning for . . . .

MR. CHERNE: If they didn't know how to plan, they knew where to take their plans from!

MR. HOWE: . . . . and it seems that the British and the French knew what they had to plan for in the way of defense, but did not plan for it. We have drawn up the plans, but we don't know just exactly how we are going to apply them.

MR. CHERNE: It would be more accurate to say that *you* don't know what we are going to apply them for.

MR. HOWE: Here's what I would like to know. I'd like to get very personal about this and find out exactly what is going to happen

to *me* when these M-Day plans go into effect. I am 39 years old, have a wife and two children; I work in a publishing house; I write for magazines, write books, and talk on the radio. What is going to happen to me when the M-Day plans go into effect?

MR. CHERNE: Actually, you have very little to worry about. Your age places you outside the immediate military class. The contemplated first military class would be between the ages of 21 and 31.[6]

MR. HEATON: Let me be personal, then. When you come to think of it, I suppose this is probably the most intensely and widely personal topic that has ever been discussed by this University of Chicago ROUND TABLE. It is going to affect all of us, I suppose we must admit, in one way or another. If Howe is safe because he is over 31, I have a son who will be 21 at the end of July. What is going to be his position?

MR. CHERNE: Let's assume that M-Day occurs . . . . shortly after the end of this month, and I certainly hope—as we unquestionably all do—that it won't. Almost immediately after M-Day Congress will be requested to pass what will be called the Selective Service Act. That Selective Service Act would require every young man between the ages of 21 and 31 to register. After he has registered, the registration board (and, by the way, the registration board

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[6] *Of the ten million male citizens between 21 and 31, it is estimated from experience in the last war that six million will be deferred from military service for various reasons. Four million will thus be available for the armed forces; if this number is not sufficient, there are three million men in the 18–21 year old class and a much larger percentage of this group would go into the fighting services due to inability to secure deferment because of dependents or their importance in the industrial system. Finally there remain the thirteen million men in the 31–45 age group, of whom it is estimated most will be supporting dependents or working in key industries, with perhaps three million available for military service.*

WORKERS EXEMPTED FROM NECESSITY OF SERVICE

AVERAGE PER CENT IN SELECTED INDUSTRIAL GROUPS

Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry

Mines, quarries, and oil wells

Building: carpenters, painters, plasterers, etc.

Chemical industries, explosives, paint, soap

Liquor and beverage industries

Iron and steel, shipbuilding, brass, other metal industries

Paper and printing industries

Bakeries, candy, other food factories

All other industries

EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS TEN PER CENT OF EXEMPTION CLAIMS GRANTED

will be a civilian local board—his own neighbors) will determine whether or not he is in an essential activity. In other words, is he, John Smith, a machine-tool worker, necessary as a machine-tool worker? Or is he Pete Johnson, a farm worker? Is that farm activity necessary? Or take his brother Joe, who works in a brewery. Now, I believe that Joe would unquestionably be taken for military service. If he is not a necessary worker, his physical qualifications will be examined and if they are adequate he will be in uniform.[7]

MR. HEATON: I see. Well, that raises two points. In the first place, the passage of this act imposes what we used to call "conscription," or what some people prefer to call "national service." There is to be the imposition of obligatory service by young men, and I assume by business, by transportation, by capital and credit institutions, and all the other things that go to make the fighting force and the supplying of that force.

MR. CHERNE: In one sentence, the industrial and selective service plans, in the event of war, are for this purpose: Every phase of our normal civilian life, property, energy, money, wealth, capabilities, is to be translated into activity necessary for the war effort.

MR. HOWE: You spoke about this fellow working down at the brewery. Aren't we going to have any beer if there is a war? We certainly are going to need entertainment; we are going to need good civilian morale. We ought to be able to feel well or we won't be able to do any fighting. Even in Germany they have beer in wartime.

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[7] *For a tabulation of deferments in the last war, see opposite page. Medical exemptions from service are based fundamentally on the inability of the prospective soldier to undergo the hardships of military life, and doctors have considerable discretion in determining physical fitness in individual cases. Unconditional exemption goes to all less than 5 feet or more than 6 feet 6 inches tall, to those weighing less than 107 pounds, and to those so overweight as to interfere with normal physical activity. In the last war the largest single cause of exemption was bad eyes, which accounted for one-fifth of those excused. Flat feet, the classic exemption excuse, eliminated less than four per cent.*

MR. CHERNE: But there is no reason why men over 31 can't work in the brewery.

MR. HOWE: I see. That is the angle to it!

MR. CHERNE: In other words, there is going to be no effort to shut down nonessential business. A totalitarian government will not be imposed, testing each business as to whether or not it is going to continue. But if there is a shortage, if there is insufficient labor, capital, transportation, or fuel, the nonessential business will have to wait.

MR. HEATON: Now I think I see the point you are making. Apparently, we are going to have a double decision by these local committees and others. In the first place, we are going to say to each individual between 21 and 31, Is your work more important than fighting? In the second place, we are going to say to the businessman, Is your industry sufficiently important to allow you to run on if there should be need for labor and capital and materials elsewhere?

MR. CHERNE: That is entirely true! Industrial mobilization is, very simply, planned economy. It is an economy planned for a specific purpose, but planned, nevertheless. All life, all business enterprise, every economic function, every normal incentive of a peacetime economy, must on M-Day be forced into the mold of a wartime machine.

MR. HEATON: Total mobilization.

MR. CHERNE: Total mobilization, as far as is necessary. If we are fighting a nation that has a fifty-thousand man force, that is not equipped with military machinery, that is not equipped to fight total warfare, obviously there will be no need for anywhere near the total mobilization contemplated.

MR. HEATON: Yes. So we are going to have a serious strain put on our whole existing economy.

MR. HOWE: Do you suppose that this University of Chicago ROUND TABLE will be liquidated, or otherwise integrated to the war

scheme that Cherne is talking about in such a menacing fashion here?

MR. HEATON: I can see some local committee looking down its list of priorities, and it will pass down elevator boys as nonessentials—elevator girls will do; it will probably decide that bus drivers can be female; and it will get to the ROUND TABLE.

MR. CHERNE: You remind me of a very humorous instance during the first World War. A college professor—and this is no reflection on you, Heaton—was in charge of a division to determine which activities were considered essential. The question of corsets and corset laces came up, and he decided that corsets were essential but that corset laces were not essential because, as he said, "they can just as well wear them without any trimming."

MR. HEATON: This ROUND TABLE, I suspect, might be low down in the list of essentials; it might cease to be a ROUND TABLE. It might be allowed to survive as a semicircle, or it might even become a solo—a loud speaker—saying the right kind of thing.

In any event some will go off and fight and the great bulk of the population will be working at lines which seem to be most essential.

MR. CHERNE: Approximately ten men are required in civilian activity for every man at the front.

MR. HOWE: I'd like to get back to this matter of where that front might be. I have had an idea for the last year and a half that this country is going to have to take over what I would call limited imperialism; that is, a kind of protection for a certain section of the world: Latin America; possibly parts of the Far East. Isn't that whole economy that we are going to protect going to change our own economic system and our own problems?

MR. CHERNE: I wish our audience could see you blush when you used the words "limited imperialism."

MR. HOWE: By "limited imperialism" I mean limited in the amount of area it covers, and limited in type. That's not the old-fashioned system of having a viceroy who orders the natives around.

COORDINATING NATIONAL RE
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
STATUTORY PEACETIME ESTABLISHMENT
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
OTHERS
SECRETARY OF WAR
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
OTHERS
ADVISORY COUNCIL
EMERGENCY ESTABLISHMENT
TO BE SET UP, IF AND WHEN REQUIRED, TO ADMINISTER NATIONAL RESOURCES DURING THE WAR
THESE AGENCIES ARE TEMPORARY IN NATURE AND TERMINATE WITH THE WAR EMERGENCY
THE ARMED FORCES AND CIVIL POPULATION
WAR DEPARTMENT
NAVY DEPARTMENT
JOINT BOARD
ARMY AND NAVY MUNITION BOARD
OTHER JOINT BOARDS
EXISTING STATUTORY AGENCIES OF THE ARMY AND NAVY
EACH RESPONSIBLE FOR DESIGN, COMPILATION OF REQUIREMENTS, AND PROCUREMENT OF MATERIALS ASSIGNED TO IT
ARMY SUPPLY SYSTEM
SUPPLY ARMS AND SERVICES
NAVY SUPPLY SYSTEM
BUREAUS AND OFFICES NAVY DEPARTMENT
EXISTING FIELD PROCUREMENT AGENCIES OF THE ARMY AND NAVY
TO BE EXPANDED TO WAR STRENGTH WHEN NECESSARY
PROCUREMENT DEPOTS, DISTRICTS, ARSENALS, OTHER PROCUREMENT AGENCIES
NAVAL DISTRICTS AND MUNITIONS FACTORIES

EXISTING AND POTENTIAL MANUFACTURING CAPACITY AND MATERIAL RESOURCES OF THE N

FROM

Adapted from *Mobilizin*

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IOR WAR


PRESIDENT
OTHER STATUTORY EXECUTIVE AGENCIES
INDEPENDENT ESTABLISHMENTS
OR OF WAR RESOURCES
●PUBLIC RELATIONS
●SELECTIVE SERVICE
OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES●
RCES ADMINISTRATION
ON POWER AND FUEL●
RITY FACILITIES●
NG CONSERVATION
CE COMMODITIES●
NS AND PROGRAMS
●WAR FINANCE ADMINISTRATION
●WAR TRADE ADMINISTRATION
●WAR LABOR ADMINISTRATION
●PRICE CONTROL AUTHORITY
THE CIVIL POPULATION AND GROUPS OTHER THAN THE ARMED FORCES
REGIONAL ADVISORS
IPVICE COMMITTEES
OURCES AND MANUFACTURING
ITIES OF THE NATION
●MEMBER OF ADVISORY COUNCIL WHICH INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WAR, NAVY, AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY

ONS BOARD. MARCH 16, 1939. DRAWING NO. 833

merica—see page 23

MR. HEATON: Might I whisper the "white man's burden," Howe?

MR. HOWE: I'm afraid you might!

MR. HEATON: It will be a pretty big burden. In any case, it is quite clear that, whatever we take on, whether it is hemispheric, or . . . . what is the new word? . . . . quarterspheric, or whether we are content with three million square miles in forty-eight states, the double job of getting men to the front will be tremendous.

MR. CHERNE: The question of limited imperialism is in itself a fulltime job for another ROUND TABLE program. We are faced here with the problem of what will happen to affect our way of life in the event that war ever does occur in the United States. We are not supposed to determine under what circumstances war can occur, or for what reason.

MR. HOWE: I think that a lot of listeners will be thinking of that. I am just an ordinary person myself in those ways, like a lot of the people, and I don't see why we would not want to know where this fighting is going to be, what we are going to fight for, where we are going to go, and what we are going to get out of it.

MR. CHERNE: I am not sure that we can contribute anything to the information the listeners already have.

MR. HEATON: I think that Cherne answered your question when he explained that the defensive and strategic plans were to cope with all emergencies, and until we know which of those plans is to be used we may not know the extent to which we require industrial and other kinds of equipment: how many battleships we need, how many planes, how many gas masks, and so on. But I think Cherne is right when he suggests that we had better settle up what it means in terms of industrial organization.

I am wondering very much about whether the wage-earners' conditions are going to vary; whether the standard of living is going to suffer. If it doesn't, it will be, I think, the first war in the world's his-

tory where wage-earners in general have not had to undergo a substantial decline in *real* wages.

MR. CHERNE: As you know, it is very difficult to discuss any limitation of the rights of labor in a period when labor is just beginning to cut its teeth on some substantial food.

MR. HEATON: Its first or second teeth?

MR. CHERNE: Second teeth.

MR. HOWE: In Germany, for example, during this war, hasn't the war cracked down relatively harder on the people of money and property than on the laboring classes? The laboring classes, of course, had practically nothing to lose when the war began. They were ground down about as close to the line as possible.

MR. CHERNE: When a laborer works sixty hours a week there isn't much more you can do with him.

MR. HOWE: That's it, and wouldn't the problem probably be somewhat the same here? Wouldn't our top people have to take a proportionately larger cut on what they are earning than the laboring people?

MR. CHERNE: On the whole, that is entirely true.

MR. HEATON: But they could afford it.

MR. CHERNE: Of course.

MR. HEATON: Our problem concerns the men near the subsistence line. Of the 49 million of the gainfully employed in this country, let us assume that 30 or 35 million are dependent on wages and salaries, the purchasing power of which may be substantially influenced.[8]

Do the plans envisage any machinery by which we could control wages and prices and supplies and other things of that sort in order to avoid as far as possible a disturbance of that standard of living?

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[8] *Estimates for employment during 1939 approximated 45,000,000 (National Industrial Conference Board) and 43,000,000 (American Federation of Labor).*

MR. CHERNE: Very briefly, here is the picture: Price control will be the keystone in any industrial mobilization plan. Unless you can control the prices of your basic commodities, it is absolutely impossible to control the cost of living; if you can't control the cost of living, it is impossible to control the wages of labor; if you can't control the wages of labor, it is impossible to control industry and the price that industry demands for its materials from the government; and if you can't control industry, you can't have industrial mobilization. You might just as well forget about your war.

MR. HEATON: That is interesting, because I feel that in two particular respects, perhaps, we are in a better position than in any previous war. In the first place, I think our banking and our credit structure is better organized, with the centralized banking and federal reserve and all the other parts of our currency and credit equipment. In the second place, I think we have our productive organization in much better shape.

MR. HOWE: Isn't that partly because we have a more self-sufficient country, more uniformly developed, than we had twenty-five years ago? Aren't these questions of credit and gold and banking and the rest largely a result rather than a cause? A lot of people talk as if you do something to the money or currency or credit and everything is settled. Hasn't what we have done been really to get ourselves on a much more efficient industrial basis and credit and finance have just followed along in due order?

MR. CHERNE: I would not be too complacent about the self-sufficiency. There are 87 commodities that we do not manufacture or mine ourselves that are absolutely essential for any military production: the strategic, critical, and essential commodities.[9] It is impossible to manufacture steel, the basic equipment, without manganese, and manganese is not to be found in the United States in the proportions required for even a peacetime effort.

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[9] *For a list of these materials see the* ROUND TABLE *of June 23, 1940 —"America's Capacity to Arm," Appendix.*

MR. HEATON: That involves, of course, organization before M-Day comes. But I think there was a great deal of truth in what Howe said. I put it this way: that we are economically more mature. A certain one-time New Dealer published a very great book in the 1920's called *Industry's Coming of Age.*[10] I think what has happened since the last war is that American financial institutions and American industries have grown up in all sorts of ways. They have lost, if you like, the exuberance of the old days, but they have become organized and you can see the flow of capital and credit and you can see the flow of production. The organization of an enterprise like General Motors is an amazing achievement in the flow of commodities to a certain central assembling point. That is what we need for war. We have it this time.

MR. HOWE: We have, yes. I'd like to mention a certain non-New Dealer, I suppose you would call him, Mr. Edward Stettinius, Jr., who is the head of this National Board of Defense. He said yesterday that everything was in fine shape and going along very smoothly.[11] Unlike what Cherne has said, he made us think we were in pretty good shape. Is he kidding us or trying to build up his Board, or what is his idea?

MR. CHERNE: He is not kidding us along. He is merely indicating that steps are being taken, but that does not mean that the steps have been completed.

Now let me not overemphasize the trend to which my remarks are going. As a matter of fact, I have felt that there is much too

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[10] *By Rexford Guy Tugwell, in 1927.*

[11] *In submitting a "progress report," Mr. Stettinius said: "The situation generally is more hopeful than we anticipated six weeks ago when this commission [i.e., the National Defense Advisory Commission] was appointed by the President." The Commission, Mr. Stettinius stated, has had "a most gratifying response from industry," which is making available to it "vital and most confidential information from mills, factories, and research laboratories."*

great concern over our lack of preparedness. Our lack of preparedness is nowhere near as acute as our columnists and amateur commentators would have it appear. We are infinitely better prepared than we were in 1917; infinitely better prepared than England or France. We have a plan. The only other country that had a plan was Germany. And, as you say, Howe, our industrial equipment is infinitely superior to what it was at the time of the World War.

MR. HEATON: Isn't preparedness a relative term, just like strength? You might have said we were pretty well prepared up to about May 16, but the events since May 16 make us realize that against certain eventualities we are not prepared.[12]

We are talking about an M-Day plan. Isn't it true that when we press the button and tell everybody that the M-Day plan is going into operation that its success depends upon the preparing of plans before "M"? When all is said and done, M is the thirteenth letter in the alphabet, and I think a good deal depends upon the success of our L plan, and of our K plan, and of our J, I, H, G, F, E, D, C, B, and A plans. If we can feel that during these months we can get those plans into good working order, then we can switch on to the M-Day plan when necessary.

MR. HOWE: I am glad to hear Cherne make a positive, cheerful statement about this whole business. I don't think that we are in anything like as bad shape as some people would have us believe. The danger, though, gets back to what I have insisted on from the beginning. Do we know exactly what we are planning for? There is no question about our ability to defend our own frontiers and our own continental area. The question is, how much more than that continental area can we defend? How much more may we have to defend?

MR. CHERNE: Again let me reiterate, Howe, that our industrial mobilization and selective service plans are based upon a maximum effort. In other words, it is contemplated that four million

[12] *Since the collapse of the Low Countries.*

young men will be put into uniform. Actually, though, the War and Navy Departments don't feel that any more than a million will be required in one year after M-Day. But the plans are based on a four-million man army, and the machinery, munitions, equipment, are based on that maximum effort: a war against any combination of possible hypothetical enemies.

MR. HOWE: Would that include the Navy as well as the Army?

MR. CHERNE: That would. It does not mean that we have all it takes; it does mean that the plans are based upon that requirement.

MR. HEATON: Don't you think that many of these criticisms of our preparedness are criticisms of perfection? I can see the textbooks ten years hence adding a chapter on this period. They will say we failed on this and that and the other thing. They will point out all sorts of "bottlenecks" and so on, but, of course, it will simply be the unexpected, and the human shortcomings and the events we were unable to foresee.

MR. CHERNE: That is not entirely true. There are those that deserve criticism for shortsightedness in this direction. It is interesting to note that there are 200 items of military machinery, military products absolutely necessary in time of war, which industry today is not equipped to manufacture. It will take anywhere from six months to eighteen months to manufacture those items.

MR. HOWE: Admitting all that, isn't there nevertheless ground for some suspicion on the part of some people that possibly this M-Day plan is being used by people who are interested in other things than the defense of this country, or even the defense of Latin America; that these M-Day plans may be being used by them to foist on us a system of conscription, compulsory military service, all sorts of government controls and practices that really are not necessary even after M-Day; that all this excitement is being used, as I say, for other aims which M-Day is supposed to prevent by preventing that sort of thing from coming and attacking us?

MR. HEATON: Which, of course, is perfectly good human nature.

It seems quite clear that M-Day is going to be a day of very far-reaching change in the life of most of us, and you two gentlemen seem to think, or suggest, that its dawning is well-nigh inevitable. This M-Day plan is, apparently, a serious, ambitious attempt to foresee the needs for our fighting power, and to be sure there is an ample stream of men and munitions and food and capital and credit flowing to the points where they are needed. The success of the plan seems to depend upon the success of the preparations we make between now and M-Day, and I don't suppose anybody expects it to work perfectly or smoothly. There will be lots of short foresight, there will be plenty of original sin, and there will be plenty of wasted effort; but at least, apparently, the plan has been as democratically devised as any such plan ever has been and it is as good a guarantee as we can probably get for the preservation of American independence, and maybe even of American democracy.

MR. HOWE: Yes, I hope so!

SUGGESTED READINGS

BIDWELL, PERCY, and TOBIN, HAROLD J., *Mobilizing Civilian America.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1940. *A comprehensive volume giving the results of a two-year study of the techniques of industrial and civilian mobilization, tracing their development from 1914 to 1939.*

CHERNE, LEO M., "M-Day and the Business Man," *Harpers,* July, 1940. *An analysis of the industrial mobilization idea with special emphasis on its effect on the average American businessman—his workers, his supplies, his sales, his profits.*

———, *M-Day and What It Means to You.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940. *A study of M-Day in terms of specific questions and answers about its effect on the average citizen, the average worker, and the average businessman.*

DAVENPORT, WALTER, "They've Picked Your War Job," November 4, 1939. *How the plans will work when America's war machine swings into action and how the individual's place in that machine will be allocated.*

EVANS, MICHAEL, "M-Day Hits Home!" *Coronet,* July, 1940. *The draft of 1918 compared with that of the future on the home front and in the services, with some attention to what will happen to ordinary civilian life, and our civil liberties.*

KEYHOE, DONALD E., "If War Comes—Uncle Sam's Plans for You," *American,* December, 1939. *A case history method of analyzing the M-Day plans of our government; what will happen to certain specific American groups detailed in terms of John Smith's experiences.*

———, *M-Day.* New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1940. *A more detailed study by Mr. Keyhoe along the same lines as the previous pamphlet, with a special chapter on America one year after M-Day.*

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. What were the obligations of an Ethiopian native when he was mobilized in the late Italo-Ethiopian War? Page 2.
2. What major sources of supply available in 1917–18 will presumably be unavailable if America goes to war now? Page 6.
3. Industrial mobilization planning in America began when? Page 6.
4. Will our present industrial mobilization plan be administered in case of war by civilians or army officers? Page 6.
5. The American industrial mobilization plan was used as the basis for the national defense act of what country? Page 8.
6. The contemplated first military class for the draft ranges between what ages? Page 9.
7. Approximately how many civilian workers are required for every front line fighter? Page 13.
8. Why is it impossible to have industrial mobilization unless we have price controls? Page 18.
9. How many "strategic, critical, and essential" commodities are there which are not mined or manufactured in the United States? Page 18.
10. Our mobilization and selective service plans anticipate an army of what size? Pages 20–21.
11. Approximately how many manufactured items of military necessity is American industry unequipped to manufacture today? How long will it take to begin their manufacture? Page 21.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on page 23.

*

1. What would be your best contribution to the war effort of the United States in the event of war, as a farmer, as an industrial worker, as a soldier, or as a business manager or government worker?

2. Decisions on matters of physical disability and/or deferment are to be made by local registration boards composed of civilians—your neighbors. Do you think this will result in better decisions than those that might be made by outsiders? Do you think some personal bias might enter into a decision made by a local person?

3. With all the controls our economic system will undergo if war comes, do you think we will be able after the war to return to our pre-war system? If not, how do you think it may be modified? If modified, do you think these changes will be necessarily reflected in political changes as well?

4. What course of action do you think should be taken toward those who refuse to fight when M-Day comes?
   a) They should be permitted, if sincere, to continue normal life
   b) They should be required to undertake noncombatant work as farmers, industrial workers, clerks, and so forth
   c) They should be put in jail for the duration of the war
   d) They should be severely punished by jail sentences of twenty years to life, or by the death sentence

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain sidelights on the subject matter discussed on the air. These comments are from letters received following the broadcasts June 30, "Economic Union for the Americas," and July 7, "Civil Liberties and the Fifth Column."*

*

Teach by Example

You are not proving your case as democrats by destroying or weakening your own democracy. In a world where the rule of force is dominant, militarism and war may not be ostracized by the democratic state. Nevertheless, these are to be recognized as social phenomena conflicting with democratic principles and acknowledged as holding a threat to the democratic institutions of the state harboring either one. Democracy is essentially the rule of reason and virtue while dictatorship is essentially the rule of force and evil. Given an intelligent and informed people and a comparative exposition of the two social forms, is it not logical to presume that democracy must prove eventually of the higher potency in appeal to human understanding?

W. H. D., Connecticut

*

Necessary Restrictions

Yet despite all that is said, our democracy evidently not only permits, but would seem to protect, those who teach naziism, fascism, communism. Camps are operated, teaching disseminated, even Gestapo police trained according to one report. It would seem that a true definition and understanding of "Freedom" is necessary. Too many not only uneducated but educated people interpret it as "doing and saying just as we please." We are intolerant of even the necessary restrictions of discipline, instead of realizing that *true freedom* is the result of discipline.

G. P. M., New York

*

The Others

I enjoy and gain a lot by the ROUND TABLE discussions. Never felt the urge to write because you always are fair in your discussions. Your talk this Sunday afternoon about free speech and fifth columnists got me, because you consider the Nazis (for which I have no use) the only fifth columnists. How about Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians, etc.? I consider any male or female living in this country not a citizen a fifth columnist.

W. J. K., New Jersey

All South America

Your remarks were interesting and instructive, but I did not like the suggestion that in dealing with the South American problem that just a portion of the continent be considered in working out plans for the benefit of North and South America.

We people here at the jumping off point to South America know right well about the foothold the Germans already have in Argentina, and not to push the fellows back to Europe would be playing the cards right down their alley.

S. T. C., Florida

*

In the Same Position

I have just listened with interest to your discussion on the proposed plan to pool the exports of North and South America, with Central America, I suppose, in order to prevent the New Europe from obtaining the same, except on terms dictated by ourselves.

In doing this, are we not placing ourselves exactly in the position now held by England who has been attacked by Germany for the reason that Germany claims England is withholding from Germany essential raw materials to which Germany is entitled access by all moral laws?

W. H. C., Oklahoma

*

Starvation

DONT TALK ABOUT STARVATION IN EUROPE THIS WINTER IN ONE BREATH AND DUMPING SURPLUS FOOD IN THE OCEAN IN THE NEXT. GOD HIMSELF MAY BE LISTENING IN AND TAKE A HAND WHEN FOOLS PLAN.

B. W. F., New Jersey

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48. *What Would Lincoln Think?*
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51. *The Outlook for Europe*, Beneš, Wright, Schmitt
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56. *Hitler's Economic Motives*
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70. *Relief and the WPA*
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72. *The Line-up for 1940*
73. *Will England Save Hitler?*
74. *Is the Consumer Getting His Nickel's Worth?*
75. *Did Congress Revolt?*
76. *Europe on the Verge.* August 27
77. *War Comes.* September 3
78. *Will There Be a Blackout of Peace in America?* September 10
79. *The High Cost of Living*
80. *What Will Congress Do?*
81. *How Will We Get Recovery?*
82. *Prosperity vs. Boom*

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89. *Propaganda*
90. *Russia Marches*
91. *Can Capitalism Survive the War?*
92. *Government and Business*
93. *When Tomorrow Comes*
94. *1939: Crisis Year*

1940

95. *Wages and Hours in the North and South*
96. *Is Our War News Accurate?*
97. *The Far East—Backdoor War?*
98. *The Jews*
99. *Economic War Between the States*
100. *Is Russia Losing in Finland?*
101. *Are Tariff Walls Blockading America?*
102. *War Myths*
103. *Economic Issue and 1940*
104. *Is America's Economic Frontier Closed?*
105. *Must the World Unite?*
106. *Can We Protect America?*
107. *The Census*
108. *The Archbishops Look at America*
109. *Scandinavia on the Spot*
110. *Third Term?*
111. *Where's that War Boom?*
112. *The Trojan Horse*
113. *Blitzkrieg, May, 1940*
114. *America and the Peacemongers*
115. *Babies Cost Money*
116. *If Germany Wins*
117. *Have We Time to Think?*
118. *Italy Marches*
119. *America's Capacity to Arm*
120. *Economic Union for the Americas*
121. *Civil Liberties and the Fifth Column.* July 7

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2:30 P.M. EASTERN DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME

City	*Call Letters*	*Kilocycles*	*City*	*Call Letters*	*Kilocycles*
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1230	Portland, Me.	WCSH	940
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	900	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	890
New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	790
Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1020	Wilmington, Del.	WDEL	1120
Pittsburgh, Pa.	WCAE	1220	Worcester, Mass.	WTAG	580

1:30 P.M. EASTERN STANDARD TIME

Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1440	Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1370
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	570	Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1310
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1210	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	780
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1210	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1070	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1350
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1210	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1310
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	920	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	620
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1200	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1140
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1270	Washington, D.C.	WRC	950
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1300	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1210
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	900			

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME

Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670			

12:30 P.M. CENTRAL STANDARD TIME

Amarillo, Tex.	KGNC	1410	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1280
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	930	Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Minneapolis and		
Des Moines, Ia.	WHO	1000	St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1460
Duluth, Minn., and			New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1320
Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1290	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	900
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	630	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	940	Pittsburg, Kans.	KOAM	790
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1370	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1420
Fort Worth, Texas	KGKO	570	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1400	San Antonio, Tex.	WOAI	1190
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1270	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1450
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	890	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1310
Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	940			

11:30 A.M. MOUNTAIN STANDARD TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1180	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	780	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1290
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1350	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1260
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1340	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1240
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1210			

10:30 A.M. PACIFIC STANDARD TIME

Bakersfield, Cal.	KERN	1370	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	920
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1490	Stockton, Cal.	KWG	1200

STATIONS CARRYING ROUND TABLE BY TRANSCRIPTION

Cincinnati, Ohio	WSAI	1330	10:15 P.M. EDST
Denver, Colo.	KOA	590	2:30 P.M. MST

WHAT NEXT?

Will it be

BLITZKRIEG ON BRITAIN
IRELAND INVADED
MEXICO IN REVOLT

or

HEADING for the WHITEHOUSE

(The Presidential Candidates and Their Policies)

*

The University of Chicago ROUND TABLE stands ready to present an impartial and authoritative discussion of the most significant event of national and international importance which may occur during the coming week.

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